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Abstract 
 Many lawyers, whether by training or disposition, have come to regard 
discovery as a process in which no stone is to be left unturned. With the 
advent of electronically stored information, the stones have become too 
numerous to account. Discovery rules that seek the perfection of preserving 
and producing all potentially pertinent information have become the enemy 
of the good. This article calls for a more pragmatic—and modest—
approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I show my civil procedure students a video on electronically stored 
information (ESI) created by E-discovery experts Jason Baron and Ralph 
Losey.
1
 The video, set to the type of pulsating electronic music normally 
heard prior to kickoff, sets forth a series of factoids about ESI: there will 
soon be more bytes of ESI than stars in the universe; it would take six 
million years to read each web page in the known universe; and we are 
awash in trillions of emails, tweets, text messages, and Google searches.
2
 
                                                                                                                     
 Vice President & General Counsel, Wisconsin Institute for Law & Liberty, and Adjunct 
Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School.  
 1. Jason R. Baron & Ralph E. Losey, E-Discovery: Did You Know?, YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 
2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bWbJWcsPp1M&feature=player_embedded. 
 2. Id. 
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The video also refers to studies showing that most of this information is 
never produced—and often not even thought of—in the discovery process.3 
In fact, the most common forms of retrieval, such as Boolean keyword 
searches, find a relatively small percentage of “relevant” documents.4 
Baron and Losey acknowledge that litigants now cannot “afford the whole 
truth” because of the difficulty they face sorting through billowing 
information, but Baron and Losey suggest (with, I hope and suspect, 
tongue-in-cheek) that this process may become easier in the “far future” 
with the advent of discovery conducted by artificial intelligence agents. 
The answer to the challenges of E-discovery, in other words, is the creation 
of E-lawyers. 
The video is an engaging and well-done representation of an emerging 
genre in the litigation literature, which I prefer to call “Electronic Gothic.” 
It tends, unintentionally or otherwise, to frighten litigants and lawyers 
about the irresistible world of litigation holds, search protocols, document 
retention, records preservation, data recovery, data mining, metadata, and 
iterative multi-phase discovery. The video tales about sanctions for the loss 
or destruction of information that a party did not know it had, was (at least 
subjectively) unaware that is was obligated to keep, or had inadvertently 
deleted. 
Baron and Losey’s prediction of the “far future” may be closer than we 
think,
5
 as law firms have formed E-discovery groups, and lawyers have 
fashioned careers as “E-discovery attorneys.” One such lawyer recently 
admonished law students to embrace their “inner geek,” saying, “If . . . you 
did not go to law school to work with computers and databases, then you 
might want to rethink being a litigator . . . .”6 Another prominent E-
discovery expert pointed out that lawyers tend to be drawn to the 
profession as a result of a certain acuity in “liberal arts logical analysis”—
the verbal and analytic skills that have traditionally been at the heart of the 
lawyerly craft. The profession, he suggested, thus needs to remake itself. 
Absent a disaster that sends civilization back to the Stone Age, the 
digital life is here to stay and thus so too are the dilemmas inherent in the 
ever-mounting growth of E-discovery. The complexity of managing ESI in 
litigation is almost certain to ensue as the possibilities of what can be 
created and where it can be sent become increasingly robust. While some 
of these advances may aid in the management of E-discovery, it seems a 
                                                                                                                     
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
 5. See Baron & Losey, supra note 1.  
 6. Alison A. Grounds, Evolving Technology and Strategies in the Area of E-Discovery, in 
ELECTRONIC RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND E-DISCOVERY: LEADING LAWYERS ON NAVIGATING 
RECENT TRENDS, UNDERSTANDING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AND IMPLEMENTING AN E-DISCOVERY 
STRATEGY 61 (Michaela Falls ed., Aspatore 2010), available at 2010 WL 3251514, at *14 (Aug. 
2010). 
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safe bet, as Baron and Losey suggest,
7
 that the location and production of 
ESI is going to prove much harder before becoming appreciably easier. Yet 
I want to propose that the answer—even in the near term—is not to lament 
our inability to get at the “whole truth” and dream of robo-lawyers. 
Whether Baron and Losey are right in suggesting that we cannot afford 
“the whole truth,”8 it is beyond doubt that ESI cannot be treated like paper 
in discovery. 
But it is less obvious that much of the “truth” is really lost. The idea, 
undergirding much of discovery practice, that any information, which 
might conceivably be helpful to any issue, ought to be available for perusal 
is a notion that only lawyers could love. Other professions—doctors, 
engineers, scientists—have long had to accept the reality that a certain, 
fungible quantity of information will suffice as “enough” and live with the 
ensuing uncertainty. However, the notion of open discovery, self-interest 
(more discovery means more business), and the human fear of “missing 
something”9 seem to have made lawyers peculiarly resistant to the idea of 
“enough” information.10 
While the growth of ESI is inevitable, it faces an unmovable limiting 
principle; that is, regardless how voluminous and dynamic electronic 
information may become, human beings stay blissfully limited in their 
capacity to process that information. As long as litigation remains an 
endeavor of mortals, the percentage of nonduplicative ESI that is in fact 
relevant to the “whole truth” is likely to remain rather limited. Aided by 
modern technology, people are increasingly reducing their thoughts (even 
random ones) to an electronic format. But only so much of this information 
can ever be used. Consequently, it is unlikely that all—or even a 
substantial part—will be either relevant to the object of litigation or 
necessary for the fair resolution of an underlying controversy. 
The development of E-discovery principles and rules have been an 
effort to balance cost against the value of the information by utilizing the 
traditional discovery tools of judicial management—namely, ad hoc and 
factually-intensive balancing. This will continue to be necessary. But I 
want to suggest another paradigm. As ESI continues to proliferate, 
                                                                                                                     
 7. See Baron & Losey, supra note 1. 
 8.  Id. 
 9. Because ESI results in more human communication being recorded, it fuels the dream of 
the “smoking gun”—the idea that, in a fit of candor, ill-temper or frustration, someone will write 
something that becomes “money” for the requesting party. It is unclear, however, whether the 
ability to get at random thoughts that were previously unrecorded actually results in more accurate 
litigation outcomes. 
 10. See, e.g., LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., RESHAPING THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: THE NEED FOR CLEAR, CONCISE, AND MEANINGFUL AMENDMENTS TO KEY 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 30 (May 2, 2010), available at http://www.thefederation.org/documents 
/V60N3_WhitePaper.pdf (“Many attorneys believe that zealous advocacy requires extensive 
discovery.”). 
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organizations will have to find ways to retain and access information that is 
necessary to conduct business; that is, to sell and design things, to hire and 
fire people and to do all the other things that happen in the real world and 
often the subject of litigation. 
There ought to be, at minimum, a strong presumption that the retention 
and retrieval policies created to manage this information, independent of 
the litigation process, are likely to catch almost all the information that is 
relevant within it.
11
 Although this concept has found its way into the 2006 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and pertinent case 
law, there is still more work to be done. 
I.  ESI IS DIFFERENT 
A.  The Challenges of ESI 
The digitalization of life has threatened to overwhelm the process of 
relatively unfettered, party-directed discovery. The challenges presented by 
the discovery of ESI may not be entirely “new,” but they are certainly 
“more.”12 The electronic revolution has resulted in a substantial—indeed 
geometric—increase in matters committed to writing. What may have been 
communicated by phone or in person, or not communicated at all, may 
now be expressed in emails, text messages, tweets, etc. Efforts to retrieve 
information or records of the transmission of these communications that, in 
the past, were unlikely to have even been created are now memorialized in 
the records of search engines and the “metadata” of information systems.13 
Human interactions and communications are now increasingly recorded 
somewhere. As two commentators recently observed: 
                                                                                                                     
 11. Some suggest that normal record management systems should be either driven by—or 
framed with—E-discovery in mind. See, e.g., Capitol Records, Inc. v. MP3Tunes, LLC, 261 F.R.D. 
44, 51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“The day undoubtedly will come when burden arguments based on a 
large organization's lack of internal ediscovery [sic] software will be received about as well as the 
contention that a party should be spared from retrieving paper documents because it had filed them 
sequentially, but in no apparent groupings, in an effort to avoid the added expense of file folders or 
indices.”); Steven C. Bennett, Records Management: The Next Frontier in E-Discovery?, 41 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 519, 520 (2009) (arguing that records management can support the E-discovery 
process); Grounds, supra note 5, 2010 WL 3251514, at *12 (“I am seeing a trend where the makers 
of electronic records management systems are understanding that there needs to be an E-discovery 
component in their systems . . . .”). My suggestion here is that it ought to be business necessity—
and not the needs of litigation—that should drive records management. 
 12. One commentator notes that “E-discovery expenses of $3,000,000 in just five months are 
fairly commonplace . . . .” Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding 
Unprofessional Conduct in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983, 1000 (2002) (referencing, as an 
example, Kentucky Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, Inc., No. 05-138-WOB, 2006 WL 5097354 (E.D. 
Ky. Dec. 18, 2006)). 
 13. “Metadata” may identify who created the document, the date it was created, and when it 
was opened or edited. See Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens 
Associated with E-Discovery: The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 
MERCER L. REV. 963, 968 (2008). 
4
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Information inflation reflects the fact that civilization has 
entered a new phase. Human beings are now integrated into 
reality quite differently than before. They can instantaneously 
write to millions. They engage in the real time writing of 
instant messages, wikis, blogs, and avatars. Accordingly, the 
flux of writing has grown exponentially, with resulting impact 
on cultural evolution. All this affects litigation. Vast 
quantities of new writing forms challenge the legal profession 
to exercise novel skills.
14
 
This is the temptation of E-discovery: the notion that “somewhere” in that 
mass of information “someone” may have written “something” that will be 
relevant to the issues in litigation. 
As more records are created, the possibility becomes far more likely for 
those documents not to just remain in existence “somewhere,” but rather 
often in multiple places. For instance, an electronic document can be 
repeatedly duplicated and transmitted to numerous recipients. Thus, it can 
be found in numerous “places”—not all of which are self-evident. The 
advent of “cloud computing” and applications like Google documents (or 
the simple fact that home computers may be put to business and 
professional use) raises the likelihood that certain documents may reside 
“out” of the responding organization. 
The storage of electronic information, while expensive, is easier and 
less expensive than the retention of what have traditionally been much 
smaller quantities of paper records. These stored records can, moreover, 
often be searched electronically to identify some subset of at least 
potentially relevant materials. This, too, creates opportunities to find 
“something” that might advance a litigant’s cause. 
But there are other aspects of ESI that confound these opportunities. 
Electronic data is dynamic. It can be altered—sometimes automatically and 
unintentionally—through the normal operation of the system that created 
it. Because there is a cost—both in dollars and system efficiencies—to 
retaining information, information may be automatically deleted or 
“overwritten.” While its deletion may not be irrevocable, it may make it 
relatively inaccessible—that it can be recovered only at great cost and 
effort.  
We can go on: As the volume of information metastasizes, it surpasses 
the capacity of lawyers—and traditional electronic search methods—to 
review it all. This is true despite that ESI will generally have associated 
“metadata” that may provide information about when documents were 
created, altered, and transmitted. Deciphering that data (and even the 
documents themselves) may require an understanding—or even the use—
                                                                                                                     
 14. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal System Adapt?, 
13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, 41 (2007), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v13i3/article10.pdf. 
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of the system on which they were created. Furthermore, as previously 
mentioned, ESI may be automatically deleted or altered; thus, the onset of 
litigation (or the apprehension of its potential) may require intervention to 
suspend those processes. Although notions of preserving relevant 
evidence—or sanctioning parties for spoliation—are not new, 
implementing these “litigation holds” is complicated and expensive,15 
requiring an understanding of just where diffuse forms of information can 
be found and predicting what may be relevant to litigation in which the 
claims and defenses may be nascent, ill-defined, and imperfectly 
understood. 
Finally, efforts to locate, preserve, and retrieve ESI are less transparent 
and straightforward than simply searching paper records. They require the 
application of expertise and can often result in complicated disputes about 
what can and cannot be readily obtained, leading to satellite litigation and 
“discovery about discovery.”16 This substantially increases the cost of 
discovery management and disputes. It requires software, consultants, and 
as noted earlier, attorneys specially versed in the nature of the game. 
B.  Responding to the Challenges 
Of course, these problems have not gone unnoticed and unaddressed. In 
2004, a group of prominent jurists, practitioners, and academics announced 
                                                                                                                     
 15. One commentator describes the process as follows:  
A litigation hold consists of several components that must be implemented in a 
timely manner. The time element is extremely important when dealing with 
electronically stored information because such information can be destroyed or 
modified in the usual course of a company's business and a computer system's 
routine operations. A litigation hold must be customized to the anticipated 
litigation, depending on the nature and scope of the claims; however, a number of 
different procedures and records should be included in most cases. First, notice of 
the litigation hold should be provided to all relevant employees to preserve 
information. Second, a plan establishing how relevant electronically stored 
information will be retrieved and preserved must be created. Third, notice (and 
records of such notice) directing record custodians to suspend the destruction of 
relevant information should be maintained. Fourth, a record identifying what 
evidence has been preserved should be created. Fifth, monitoring procedures to 
ensure employees are utilizing the litigation hold should be implemented. Sixth, 
notification (and records of such notification) regarding the termination of the 
hold when litigation is no longer anticipated should be maintained. 
DeBono, supra note 13, at 987–88 (citations omitted). 
 16. Paul W. Grimm et al., Discovery About Discovery: Does the Attorney-Client Privilege 
Protect All Attorney-Client Communications Relating to the Preservation of Potentially Relevant 
Information?, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 413, 426 (2008) (“Parties are permitted to inquire into an 
opponent’s efforts to preserve relevant information through interrogatories and in depositions 
directed to the opposing client.”). 
6
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(and then subsequently revised) the Sedona Principles.
17
 These fourteen 
principles seek to balance the need for discovery of ESI against its cost and 
unique challenges. They create a duty to preserve information but not one 
that requires a party to take “every conceivable step”18 or preserve 
“deleted, shadowed, fragmented, or residual”19 information absent a 
showing of special need and relevance. In ordering discovery, courts 
should balance “cost, burden[,] and need,” while considering the “nature of 
the litigation and the amount in controversy.”20 The primary (but 
apparently not exclusive) focus of E-discovery should be on “active data 
and information” as opposed to disaster recovery back-up tapes and other 
sources that are not reasonably accessible.
21
 Cost-shifting from the 
responding to the requesting party can happen on satisfaction of a multi-
factor test.
22
 One commentator recently extolled the “enduring relevance” 
of the Principles. 
In a now-famous series of opinions from the case of Zubulake v. UBS 
Warburg LLC,
23
 Judge Shira A. Scheindlin attempted a similar balance in 
the context of employment litigation involving the preservation and 
production of a large volume of emails.
24
 The decisions, now a staple of 
most civil procedure textbooks, largely track the Sedona Principles, yet 
adopt a modified framework, calling for a level of discovery and burden 
that is just right. The Zubulake series repeated the now well-accepted 
notion that “the universe of discoverable material has expanded 
exponentially” and “discovery is not just about uncovering the truth, but 
also about how much of the truth parties can afford to disinter.”25 The 
cases recognized a seven-factor test for shifting the cost of discovery.
26
 
                                                                                                                     
 17. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS 
& PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 60–66 (Jonathan M. Redgrave 
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSC_ 
PRINCP_2nd_ed_607.pdf (explaining that unless it is material to resolving the dispute, there is no 
obligation to preserve and produce metadata absent an agreement between the parties or an order of 
the court).  
 18. Id. at 28. 
 19. Id. at 49.  
 20. Id. at 17.  
 21. Id. at 45.  
 22. Id. at 67. 
 23. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).  
 24. Id. at 311, 313. 
 25. Id. at 311 (citing Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)). 
 26. Id. at 324. The factors are:  
1. The extent to which the request is specifically tailored to discover relevant 
information;  
2. The availability of such information from other sources;  
3. The total cost of production, compared to the amount in controversy;  
4. The total cost of production, compared to the resources available to each  
7
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But this cost shifting, at least in Judge Scheindlin's view, should 
not apply to readily accessible ESI, the normal rules of discovery 
should apply.
27
 The decisions made clear that a party must 
implement a “litigation hold” on ESI once it is on notice—that is, the 
party knows or should know—that the information may be relevant 
to current or future litigation: 
Once a party reasonably anticipates litigation, it must suspend 
its routine document retention/destruction policy and put in 
place a “litigation hold” to ensure the preservation of relevant 
documents. As a general rule, that litigation hold does not 
apply to inaccessible backup tapes . . . , which may continue 
to be recycled on the schedule set forth in the company's 
policy. On the other hand, if backup tapes are accessible . . . , 
then such tapes would likely be subject to the litigation hold.
28
  
In a later decision, the Zubalake court further elaborated the specific 
requirements necessitated under these circumstances: “First, counsel must 
issue a ‘litigation hold’ . . . whenever litigation is reasonably 
anticipated . . . .”29 Counsel also has a continuing duty to remind 
employees that the litigation hold is still in effect.
30
 “Second, counsel 
should communicate . . . with ‘key players’” and remind them of the duty 
to preserve.
31
 Further, “counsel must become fully familiar with her client's 
document retention policies . . . .”32 “Finally, counsel should instruct all 
employees to produce . . . [all] relevant active files” and ensure the 
evidence is “stored in a safe place” to avoid intentional or inadvertent 
destruction of potentially relevant data.
33
 “Once counsel takes these 
steps . . . , a party is fully on notice of its discovery obligations.”34 
 
                                                                                                                     
party;  
5. The relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive  
to do so;  
6. The importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and 
7. The relative benefits to the parties obtaining the information.  
Id. Not much is excluded. 
 27. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake III), 216 F.R.D. 280, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 28. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(internal parentheticals omitted). An exception applies if the company can identify employee 
documents that are stored on backup tapes. If that is the case, the tapes should be preserved if the 
information contained on those tapes is not otherwise available. Id. 
 29. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V), 229 F.R.D. 422, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 30. Id. at 434. 
 31. Id. at 433–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 32. Id. at 432. 
 33. Id. at 434. 
 34. Id. at 439.  
8
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Zubulake and other similar cases are certainly helpful, but drawing 
lessons from reported decisions still remains difficult. The cases are fact-
intensive, and the pertinent facts are highly technical. For example: in a 
recent opinion by Judge Scheindlin, subtitled “Zubulake Revisited,” it 
takes forty pages to describe the E-discovery malfeasance of the plaintiff.
35
 
A recent article describing E-discovery cases since 2006 offers relatively 
little guidance beyond the commonplace. Having read its summaries of 
approximately 150 cases, one knows little that is new. That is not a 
criticism of the article or the cases. It is not clear that more guidance is 
readily found. 
In 2006, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended to address 
the problems presented by ESI. Pursuant to amended Rule 26(b), ESI need 
not be produced from sources that the responding party has identified as 
not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost subject to 
judicial review. Courts may limit discovery if it is unreasonably cumulative 
or duplicative or can be obtained from another source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome or expensive.
36
 They may also restrict 
discovery if the seeking party has had ample opportunity to obtain the 
information or if the burden or expense of proposed discovery outweighs 
“its likely benefit considering the needs of the case, the amount in 
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in 
the action and the importance of discovery in resolving the issues.”37 By 
case law, although not rule, parties are required to take reasonable steps to 
preserve ESI when they “know or should know” of the potential relevance 
to litigation. Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that “absent extraordinary circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions” when ESI is lost “as a result of the routine, good faith operation 
of an electronic information system.”38 
                                                                                                                     
 35. Pension Comm. of the Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 685 F. 
Supp. 2d 456, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 36. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i). 
 37. Id. at 26(b)(2)(C)(iii). 
 38. Id. at 37(e). 
9
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C.  The Inadequacy of the Response 
All of this is eminently reasonable but, it would seem, not particularly 
effective. The standard for implementing a litigation hold is, for example, 
an invitation for an argument. It does little to define what must be held or 
how prescient the holding party must prove to be. Whether something is 
“reasonably accessible” is undefined, as is the “routine, good faith 
operation” of an information system.39 Of course, all legal standards are 
more or less underdetermined, but the vague nature of these standards may 
be more problematic in the context of discovery. This is largely a result of 
the fact that discovery is—and must largely remain—a process largely 
managed by the parties and one in which judicial intervention is difficult 
due to the nascent and ill-defined nature of the issues to be tried and the 
complex and technical nature of ESI. 
When judicial intervention does become necessary, Judges must assess 
such claims by evaluating the burden, need, and proportionality of 
proposed discovery with incomplete knowledge of the claims and defenses. 
The complexity of evaluating competing claims about the nature of the 
information sought and the cost of obtaining it may require the equivalent 
of a small (or not so small) trial—something difficult to do in the context 
of motion practice. Thus, the best way to avoid a premature (and perhaps 
incorrect) decision is often to err on the side of permitting discovery. 
The standard of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)—the balancing of cost and 
burden proportionately
40—may be the principle by which most disputes 
regarding the scope of discovery are resolved. That rule and its associated 
principles all contemplate relatively unrestained balancing of multiple 
factors. In essence, although no relevant factors are excluded, no particular 
result is mandated. While it is difficult to formulate specific legal rules that 
will do much more under such complex circumstances, multi-faceted and 
ambiguous balancing in response to complicated and expensive questions 
provide little guidance. Standards that call for things that are “reasonable” 
and prohibit that which is “undue” are no better than admonitions to do 
“right.” A seven-part test for anything permits almost any result. 
While some have endorsed—or at least accepted—the notion of judge 
as manager,
41
 it is hard to imagine, especially given the volume of 
litigation, that discovery could work as anything other than a process that is 
                                                                                                                     
 39. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The “Two-Tiered” Approach to E-Discovery: Has Rule 
26(b)(2)(B) Fulfilled Its Promise?, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 7, 14 (2008), 
http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v14i3/article7.pdf (explaining how the “good cause” requirements of 
rule 26(b)(2)(B), when combined with the balancing required by 26(b)(2)(C), create a “substantial 
hurdle to discovery”). 
 41. See Symposium, Ethics and Professionalism in the Digital Age, 60 MERCER L. REV. 863, 
887 (2009) (declaring that “the role of the judge is in the process of extraordinary transformation 
because of E-discovery”). 
10
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largely party managed. There is simply too much litigation and too much 
information for judges or special masters to become involved in more than 
a fraction of cases. Management of the process by the parties works best if 
there are rules that effectively provide relatively clear direction, or both 
sides have comparable incentives driving them within a realm of 
“reasonable behavior.” In cases in which both parties are more or less 
equally subject to the costs and burdens of electronic discovery, each side 
can expect the other to be just as aggressive or reasonable as it has been. 
This form of mutually assured destruction may discipline the parties and 
temper the discovery “arms race.” But, in cases of asymmetrical 
information, namely, those in which the bulk of information (particularly 
ESI) resides with one party, incentives diverge. Here the burden of 
responding to discovery is largely borne by one side, and there are fewer 
incentives to act with self-discipline. 
Even when we do move to judicial management, judges must assess 
such claims or evaluate the burden, need and proportionality of proposed 
discovery with incomplete knowledge of the claims and defenses. The 
rules require parties to confer, and a mantra of the E-discovery industry is 
to call for “collaborative” discovery. Nevertheless, parties famously 
disagree about the value of their cases and the extent of the burden that 
they are asking another to assume. However they agree on the principle of 
proportionality, that agreement is swamped by radically different 
perceptions of the amount at stake and the likelihood of recovery. The 
complexity of evaluating competing claims about highly technical 
information may require the equivalent of a small (or not so small) trial—
something difficult to do in the context of motion practice and pretrial 
management. The best way to avoid a premature (and perhaps incorrect) 
decision—or to avoid the whole mess altogether—is to err on the side of 
permitting discovery. 
D.  The Implications of Inadequacy 
If the only implication of these inadequacies was increased costs of 
discovery, that would be bad enough. But increasing the cost of litigation, 
particularly in the context of a system with at least some form of notice 
pleading, changes the dynamics of the litigation process and the calculus 
surrounding the management of litigation risk. The ability to assert a 
colorable claim, i.e., one that can survive a motion to dismiss and trigger 
the process of discovery, is an asset. Because it costs something—and 
often quite a lot—to make such a claim go away, and litigation risk can 
rarely be dismissed—whatever increases the cost of the process increases 
the value of that asset. This materially alters the settlement calculus. 
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II.  ANOTHER RESPONSE 
A.  A Modest Presumption 
The rules ought to be amended to strengthen the presumption—begun 
with the 2006 amendments—that adherence to retention and retrieval 
policies that are adopted outside the context of litigation and consistently 
applied ought to be the measure of a party’s obligation to maintain and 
produce ESI. The idea, not unrelated to Rule 34’s longstanding option to 
produce records as they are kept in the ordinary course of business,
42
 is 
rooted in the idea that most organizations formulate such policies in good 
faith and, in fact, probably cannot know in advance whether the retention 
of information will hurt or help their litigation prospects. Questions of how 
much ESI to keep, where to keep it, and how to get it are generally 
determined by the need to have access to information necessary to do 
business. Policies are presumably adopted in a way that will permit access 
to records that one needs to address the design and performance of 
products, the management of employees and other aspects of the business 
that are likely to become the subject of litigation. If that is the case, most 
relevant information will remain accessible under such generally applicable 
and neutrally-framed policies. 
To be sure, the current federal rules permit courts to limit E-discovery 
to documents resident in these systems, and, at least on its face, Federal 
Rule of Evidence 26(b) creates a presumption against the discovery of ESI 
that is not reasonably accessible.
43
 But it may be well to make clear that, 
absent extraordinary circumstances, a party is required to produce only that 
ESI stored in the active systems maintained by the party in the ordinary 
course of business. What I am suggesting is a bit of a paradigm shift: 
Perhaps we need be less concerned with whether the discovery of ESI fails 
beyond a pale of acceptable burden and cost, and more concerned with 
whether the information sought can be found within a set of sources most 
likely to contain relevant records and can be accessed in a way that a 
party’s normal records management system permits. 
An example of such an approach is reflected in an amendment to 
Rule 26 proposed by certain defense bar organizations in a white paper 
presented in a recent conference on civil litigation at Duke University Law 
School. This approach specifies that certain categories of ESI that are not 
available in the ordinary course of business need not be produced: 
                                                                                                                     
 42. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(E)(i) states, “A party must produce documents as they are kept in 
the usual course of business . . . .”  
 43. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B) (“A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored 
information from sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom 
discovery is sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost.”). 
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(B) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored 
Information. 
 (i) A party need not provide discovery of the following 
categories of electronically stored information . . .  absent a 
showing by the receiving party of substantial need and good 
cause, subject to the proportionality assessment pursuant to 
Rule 26(b)(2)(C): 
  (a) deleted, slack, fragmented, or other data only 
accessible by forensics; 
  (b) random access memory (RAM), temp files, or 
other ephemeral data that are difficult to preserve without 
disabling the operating system; 
  (c) on-line access data such as temporary internet 
files, history, cache, cookies, and the like; 
  (d) data in metadata fields that are frequently 
updated automatically, such as last-opened dates; 
  (e) information whose retrieval cannot be 
accomplished without substantial additional programming, or 
without transforming it into another form before search and 
retrieval can be achieved; 
  (f) backup data that are substantially duplicative of 
data that are more accessible elsewhere; 
  (g) physically damaged media; 
  (h) legacy data remaining from obsolete systems 
that is unintelligible on successor systems; or 
  (i) any other data that are not available to the 
producing party in the ordinary course of business and that the 
party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue 
burden or cost and that on motion to compel discovery or for 
a protective order, if any, the party from whom discovery of 
such information is sought shows is not reasonably accessible 
because of undue burden or cost.
44
 
The proposed amendment provides additional guidance for both parties 
and courts and, importantly, roots that guidance in deference to systems 
established to conduct business. It retains current language requiring that, 
under certain circumstances, a party seeking to withhold information that 
might otherwise be discoverable must demonstrate that it is not reasonably 
accessible due to undue burden and cost. However, it makes clear that 
certain specified sources of information need not be searched or produced 
                                                                                                                     
 44. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 9, at 25–26 (alteration in original). 
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without such a showing, including information whose retrieval would 
require substantial additional programming or transformation or which 
cannot be obtained in the ordinary course of business. Although the 
proposed amendment does not unambiguously establish “active” ESI under 
a generally-applicable retention policy as the entire universe for E-
discovery, the recognition that most relevant documents are likely to be 
found within accessible records under such policies informs its restrictions 
on the scope of discovery. 
This will not obviate the need for litigation holds. The fact of litigation 
or its reasonable anticipation may affect the need to retain ESI, and parties 
ought to remain under an obligation to preserve potential ESI once 
litigation has been commenced or can be reasonably anticipated. An 
amendment proposed by the white paper
45
 delivered at Duke calls for 
parallel restrictions on the type of ESI that must be preserved, once again 
providing more particular guidance that reflects a judgment about where 
potentially-relevant information is most likely to be found: 
(2) Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored 
Information 
  Absent court order demonstrating that the requesting 
party has (1) a substantial need for discovery of the 
electronically stored information requested and (2) 
preservation is subject to the limitations of Rule 26(h)(1), a 
party need not preserve the following categories of 
electronically stored information: 
  (A) deleted, slack, fragmented, or other data only 
accessible by forensics; 
  (B) random access memory (RAM), temp files, or 
other ephemeral data that are difficult to preserve without 
disabling the operating system; 
  (C) on-line access data such as temporary internet 
files, history, cache, cookies, and the like; 
  (D) data in metadata fields that are frequently updated 
automatically, such as last-opened dates; 
  (E) information whose retrieval cannot be 
accomplished without substantial additional programming, or 
without transferring it into another form before search and 
retrieval can be achieved; 
  (F) backup data that are substantially duplicative of 
data that are more accessible elsewhere; 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Id. 
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  (G) physically damaged media; 
  (H) legacy data remaining from obsolete systems that 
is unintelligible on successor systems; or 
  (I) any other data that are not available to the 
producing party in the ordinary course of business.
46
 
It is certainly possible that the exclusion of these sources of 
information from preservation and production will eliminate some 
information that might be relevant to litigation. It is less clear that they will 
render the results less accurate. 
The amendments proposed at Duke also modify Rule 37(e) to make 
clear that sanctions may not be imposed for the failure to preserve ESI in 
the absence of a finding of willful conduct.
47
 This expansion of the rule’s 
safe harbor provision places the emphasis on normally-followed retention 
and retrieval procedures. The difficulty, however, is that sanctions for 
failure to preserve documents generally contain some presumption that the 
lost information would have helped the requesting party or hurt the party 
who has failed to produce it. But, in the absence of some finding of 
willfulness, that presumption is unwarranted. Although a responding party 
might certainly be required to restore the cost of recovering lost ESI, 
further sanctions as a consequence of negligence are problematic, at least 
in the absence of some information about whether lost ESI would have 
helped or hurt the responding party. 
B.  Cost Allocation 
The amendments proposed by the defense bar  accomplish additional 
useful objectives, such as limiting the number of document requests and 
the sources that can be searched.
48
 Nevertheless, limitation of the universe 
of ESI that must be preserved and produced won’t resolve all of the special 
challenges presented by E-discovery. Even active data systems maintained 
by parties in the ordinary course of business may produce enormous 
quantities of information. Presumably, parties will create methods of 
retrieving pertinent information for business purposes that balance the 
needs of that information with the cost of retrieval. Those systems ought to 
be treated as presumptively sufficient. 
But most regularly-maintained databases are subject to some form of 
keyword or other electronic search that will, even without duplicates, result 
in mass quantities of information that will be exceedingly expensive—or 
even stretch human capacities—to review. Perhaps the best solution to this 
                                                                                                                     
 46. Id. at 36–37.  
 47. Id. at 38. 
 48. I am old enough to have been a seasoned litigator when courts began to limit—and rather 
arbitrarily at that—the number of interrogatories and both the number and length of depositions. 
How, we wondered, could the search for truth be continued? It turns out we managed quite well. 
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problem is to place the cost of discovery with the requesting party. 
Internalization of externalized costs is generally thought to lead to greater, 
rather than less, efficiency. Perhaps the best way to ensure that the cost of 
discovery is proportional to what is at stake is to ask whether the party 
seeking it—the one who is presumably in the best position to know—is 
willing to pay for it.
49
 
While this may be thought to burden the ability of less wealthy litigants 
to pursue a claim, the investment of substantial resources into litigation on 
behalf of non-wealthy parties thought by counsel to have a meritorious 
claim is quite common in a variety of contexts and has not materially 
impeded the pursuit of claims. 
Although these costs would presumably be taxable upon resolution of 
the case on the merits, very few cases are resolved on the merits. To be 
sure, the fact that the cost of discovery is potentially taxable would affect 
the settlement calculus and indirectly discipline discovery. But a more 
direct impact would require these costs to be paid at the time that they are 
incurred. While this might lead to pretrial satellite litigation over the 
reasonableness of those costs, this seems more manageable and predictable 
than the more amorphous standards that currently control. It would involve 
the rather straightforward question of what undertaking a particular task 
has or will cost and not an assessment of whether, at some point in the 
future after underdeveloped issues become clear, it will have been “worth 
it.” 
CONCLUSION 
I close with a story from my young days as a lawyer. Rising to begin 
the introduction of my rebuttal case in a trial to the bench, the judge looked 
down at me and said, “Now, Mr. Esenberg, you do what you need to do. 
But first ask yourself if anything you are about to do proves anything that 
hasn't been proven four times already, because I'm ready to rule.” I sat 
down, learning an important lesson of trial advocacy: when to stop. 
“When to stop” E-discovery is a difficult question. My modest 
suggestion is that lawyers take their cue from the ways in which such 
information is managed in the “real world.” The electronic revolution has 
enabled many wonderful possibilities, but in litigation and elsewhere, we 
ought not to allow our desire for the perfect become the enemy of the good. 
 
                                                                                                                     
 49. A full consideration of this idea is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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